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RACIAL PROFILING IN THE WAR ON DRUGS MEETS
THE IMMIGRATION REMOVAL PROCESS:
THE CASE OF MONCRIEFFE V. HOLDER
Kevin R. Johnson*
INTRODUCTION
In Moncrieffe v. Holder,1 the Supreme Court held that the Board of
Immigration Appeals could not remove a long-term lawful perma-
nent resident from the United States based on a single
misdemeanor conviction for possession of a small amount of mari-
juana. The decision clarified the meaning of an “aggravated
felony”2 for purposes of removal, an important question under the
U.S. immigration laws.
* Dean and Mabie-Apallas Professor of Public Interest Law and Chicana/o Studies,
University of California at Davis School of Law; A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D.,
Harvard University. Thanks to UC Davis law student Dawei Chi, Class of 2014, for research
assistance and securing a copy of the police report documenting the stop and arrest of
Adrian Moncrieffe that served as the basis for the conviction and removal proceedings at
issue in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013). Laura Flores and Laraya Parnell of the
Class of 2015 also provided research and editorial assistance. I received helpful comments on
a draft of this paper from Gabriel (Jack) Chin, Leticia Saucedo, and Yoshinuri (Toso) Himel.
I also received helpful comments from the audience at presentations of this paper at the
Denver and Michigan law schools and at a seminar held by the Aoki Center for Race and
Nation Studies at UC Davis. Thanks to the editors of the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform for organizing this symposium, inviting me to participate, and assisting in readying
this paper for publication. Ideas that I have previously expressed on the ImmigrationProf
blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/immigration/ and as the regular immigration
contributor to SCOTUSblog, www.scotusblog.com, can be found at various places in this
article. I was among the law professors who submitted an amici curiae brief in support of the
Petitioner in the Supreme Court in Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013), a decision that
is analyzed in this article. See Brief of Immigration Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/briefs/11-702__petitioner
amcuimmigrationlawprofs.authcheckdam.pdf.
1. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
2. See Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)
(2012) (defining “aggravated felony” for purposes of the INA). One commentator summa-
rized the steady expansion of the definition of an “aggravated felony” as follows:
When Congress first enacted the aggravated felony removal category in 1988, only
three serious crimes were included: murder, drug trafficking, and firearms trafficking.
The current list—now at twenty-eight offenses, some of which create further sub-cate-
gories—includes crimes that are neither aggravated nor felonies under criminal law.
Misdemeanor drug possession with a one-year sentence can qualify as an aggravated felony, as
does a year of probation with a suspended sentence for pulling hair—a misdemeanor under
Georgia law. Convictions for selling ten dollars worth of marijuana, theft of a ten-dollar video
game, shoplifting fifteen dollars worth of baby clothes, and forging a check for less than twenty
967
968 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 48:4
In the removal proceedings, Adrian Moncrieffe, a black immi-
grant from Jamaica, did not challenge his arrest and drug
conviction. Consequently, the Supreme Court did not review the
facts surrounding, or the lawfulness of, the criminal prosecution.
Nonetheless, the traffic stop resulting in Moncrieffe’s initial arrest,
and the subsequent interactions with police, strongly suggest that
race influenced the events leading to the criminal conviction.3 An
examination of the facts of his case highlights how the modern
criminal justice system works in combination with immigration re-
moval proceedings to disparately impact communities of color in
the United States.
Over the last few decades, modern immigration enforcement has
evolved into a tough, fast-moving criminal-immigration removal sys-
tem. As Moncrieffe’s case attests, undocumented immigrants are
not the only noncitizens subject to possible removal from the
United States. The U.S. government frequently threatens to remove
long-term lawful permanent residents convicted of relatively minor
crimes. Many of these lawful permanent residents have deep ties to
the community—ties that include children who are U.S. citizens.4
The group of noncitizens subject to removal tends to be racially
skewed. That is partially due to the fact that a significant percentage
of immigrants are racial minorities.5 Moreover, the ordinary opera-
tion of the criminal justice system produces racially disparate
impacts, in no small part due to racial profiling in traffic stops that
dollars have all been held to be aggravated felonies. Aggravated felonies trigger mandatory deten-
tion, deportation without the possibility of almost all forms of discretionary relief, including
asylum and cancellation of removal, and a permanent bar on lawful reentry.
Jason A. Cade, The Plea-Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
1751, 1758–59 (2013) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
3. See Racial Profiling: Definition, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, available at http://www.aclu
.org/racial-justice/racial-profiling-definition (last visited May 11, 2015) (defining racial pro-
filing as the targeting by law enforcement of persons because of their perceived race). For
the facts surrounding the traffic stop that led to the search, arrest, and conviction of Adrian
Moncrieffe on marijuana charges, see infra Part II.
4. See Maritza I. Reyes, Constitutionalizing Immigration Law: The Vital Role of Judicial Discre-
tion in the Removal of Lawful Permanent Residents, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 637, 639–40 (2012); Wilber
A. Barillas, Note, Collateral Damage: Drug Enforcement & Its Impact on the Deportation of Legal
Permanent Residents, 34 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 1, 1–4 (2014). See generally Shani M. King, U.S.
Immigration Law and the Traditional Nuclear Conception of Family: Toward A Functional Definition
of Family That Protects Children’s Fundamental Human Rights, 41 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509
(2010) (analyzing impacts of removal on families, including those with U.S. citizen children);
David B. Thronson, You Can’t Get Here from Here: Toward a More Child-Centered Immigration Law,
14 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 58 (2006) (to the same effect); Marie Weisenberger, Comment,
Broken Families: A Call for Consideration of the Family of Illegal Immigrants in U.S. Immigration
Enforcement Efforts, 39 CAP. U. L. REV. 495 (2011).
5. See infra Part I.A–B.
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are a staple of the “war on drugs.”6 This Article contends that the
racially disparate impacts of the criminal justice system exacerbate
the racially disparate impacts of the modern immigration removal
system.7 To illustrate this claim, I analyze how the racially-tinged
stop, arrest, and conviction of Adrian Moncrieffe for drug posses-
sion led to the initiation of the proceedings to remove him from
the United States. Ultimately, this analysis reveals how racial minori-
ties find themselves in the crosshairs of both the modern criminal
justice and immigration removal systems.
Part I of this Article places Moncrieffe v. Holder in its proper histor-
ical, legal, and regulatory context. It provides the necessary
background about the emergence of “crimmigration” law, which is
characterized by the tightening nexus between the criminal justice
system and immigration enforcement.8
Part II provides the details of Adrian Moncrieffe’s brush with po-
lice. Following a routine traffic stop, police officers questioned
Moncrieffe and used a drug sniffing dog to search his car. Mon-
crieffe’s interactions with the officers on the scene appear to have
been shaped by his race and culminated in a criminal conviction.
That conviction, in turn, resulted in Moncrieffe’s placement in re-
moval proceedings. After living in the United States for more than
two decades, he faced possible deportation as a result of a dubious
traffic stop, culminating in a minor criminal conviction.
Part III of this Article reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in
Moncrieffe v. Holder. The decision, similar to the Court’s general
criminal procedure and immigration jurisprudence, wholly ignored
the racial dynamics of Moncrieffe’s original stop, search, arrest, and
conviction. The Court instead treated the matter as a routine—and
race neutral—immigration removal matter, little different from the
tens of thousands of such proceedings resulting in removal orders
each year, with ninety-five percent of orders subjecting Latinos to
deportation from the United States.9
6. See infra text accompanying notes 54–58.
7. See infra Parts I–II.
8. See generally Jennifer M. Chacón, Overcriminalizing Immigration, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM-
INOLOGY 613 (2012) (analyzing the over-criminalization of immigration law); Allegra M.
McLeod, The U.S. Criminal-Immigration Convergence and Its Possible Undoing, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 105 (2012) (criticizing the growing reliance on the criminal law as a means of enforcing
the U.S. immigration laws); Teresa A. Miller, Blurring the Boundaries Between Immigration and
Crime Control After September 11th, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2005) (discussing the conse-
quences of the increasing interaction between the criminal justice system and the
immigration laws); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign
Power, 56 AM. U.L. REV. 367 (2006) (analyzing the increasing confluence of modern U.S.
immigration law and criminal law and coining the phrase “crimmigration law”).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 51–53.
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Moncrieffe’s story exemplifies how a racially disparate criminal
justice system exacerbates racially disparate removals. Although
Moncrieffe was fortunate enough to avoid deportation, many lawful
permanent residents are not so lucky.10 Still, Moncrieffe v. Holder in-
advertently highlights significant issues of race in the modern
immigration removal system. Namely, the symbiotic relationship be-
tween the modern criminal justice and immigration removal
systems compound the racial disparities in immigration removals
and demonstrate the need for careful consideration of reforms to
immigration laws and their enforcement.11
I. THE CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL SYSTEM:
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT THROUGH RELIANCE ON
CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
A police stop of Adrian Moncrieffe’s sport utility vehicle on the
interstate in Georgia in 2006 triggered two separate, distinct, and
independent, although inextricably related, legal processes. The
first legal proceeding was Moncrieffe’s criminal prosecution for
possessing a small amount of marijuana, an offense to which he
pleaded guilty in Georgia state court.12 Based on this single convic-
tion, the U.S. government initiated proceedings in immigration
court seeking Moncrieffe’s removal from the United States. The re-
moval case eventually made it all the way to the Supreme Court.13
Because of the Executive Branch’s contemporary border enforce-
ment priorities, removal proceedings like Moncrieffe’s are all too
common. What is extremely uncommon about his case is that the
Supreme Court intervened to halt the immigrant’s removal.
This Part looks generally at how arrests and convictions for rela-
tively minor crimes can result in the removal of noncitizens,
including long-term, lawful permanent residents with deep ties to
the United States. It also details how routine traffic stops can trigger
removal, an exercise that demonstrates how the ordinary operation
of the modern criminal justice system directly contributes to racially
disparate immigration enforcement actions.
10. See infra Part I.
11. See, e.g., Mary Fan, The Case for Crimmigration Reform, 92 N.C. L. REV. 75, 132–47
(2013) (making the case for reform of the immigration law and its reliance on the criminal
justice system for removal); see also supra note 8 (citing authorities noting the emergence of
crimmigration law).
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part III.
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A. Modern Immigration Enforcement
Beginning in 1996, Congress passed a series of increasingly
tough immigration enforcement laws. These laws greatly expanded
the grounds for removal, making it virtually mandatory to remove a
noncitizen convicted of an “aggravated felony”; over the years, Con-
gress had added to the list of offenses that qualify as “aggravated
felonies.”14 Congress also limited the forms of relief from removal
available to noncitizens convicted of crimes; increased the use of
mandatory detention for noncitizens convicted of crimes and await-
ing deportation; and restricted—in many instances eliminating—
judicial review of removal and related decisions for noncitizens con-
victed of crimes.15 During roughly the same period, Congress, with
the support of the President, appropriated record levels of funding
to border enforcement.16 Such appropriations allowed for the rapid
militarization of the U.S./Mexico border through enhanced tech-
nology, extension of the border fence, and ever-increasing numbers
of Border Patrol officers patrolling the region.17
One commentator aptly summarized contemporary develop-
ments in American immigration enforcement as follows:
The deportation of “criminal aliens” is now the driving force
in American immigration enforcement. In recent years, the
Congress, the Department of Justice, the Department of
Homeland Security, and the White House have all placed
14. See supra note 2 (quoting authority about the steady expansion of the definition of
“aggravated felony” for purposes of removal under the immigration laws).
15. These changes to the immigration laws have been brought about by a series of
pieces of immigration legislation enacted by Congress, including the REAL ID Act, Pub. L.
109-13, 119 Stat. 231, 302–311 (2005); Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Pub. L.
No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 342–362 (2001); and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immi-
grant Responsibility Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–546 (1996).
16. See Gerald P. López, Don’t We Like Them Illegal?, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1711, 1780–97
(2012) (summarizing the expansion of border enforcement in the Clinton, Bush, and
Obama administrations).
17. See Elvia R. Arriola, Voices from the Barbed Wires of Despair: Women in the Maquiladoras,
Latina Critical Legal Theory, and Gender at the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 729, 807–08
(2000); Megan L. Capasso, An Attempt at a “12 Step Program”: President Bush’s Comprehensive
Strategy to Rehabilitate California and Mexico’s Addiction to Illegal Immigration: Does It Strike the
Correct Societal Balance?, 34 W. ST. U. L. REV. 87, 102 (2006); Suzy Khimm, Want Tighter Border
Security? You’re Already Getting It, WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2013), available at http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/29/the-2007-immigration-bill-set-border-
security-targets-weve-hit-most-of-them.
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criminals front and center in establishing immigration-en-
forcement priorities. . . . In effect, federal immigration
enforcement has become a criminal removal system.18
The modern focus on the removal of noncitizens reflects the
shifting political priorities concerning immigration enforcement.
Public concern with immigration—especially from Mexico—has
steadily increased over the last few decades.19 Noncitizens convicted
of crimes are especially unpopular with the general public.20 Re-
sponding to sustained political pressure for greater immigration
enforcement, the Executive Branch took increasingly aggressive
measures, often emphasizing that it targets “criminal aliens.”21 As a
result, the United States removed record numbers of noncitizens,
including many minor criminal offenders as well as serious ones, in
recent years.22
Over the past decade, Congress considered numerous immigra-
tion reform proposals.23 Some of the proposals include
components that focus on goals other than stricter border enforce-
ment, such as offering a path to legalization for certain groups of
undocumented immigrants.24 As part of the political efforts to prod
congressional action on immigration reform, the Obama adminis-
tration has frequently expressed a commitment to heightened
enforcement, which is consistent with its overall record of increas-
ing removals.25
18. Ingrid V. Eagly, Criminal Justice for Noncitizens: An Analysis of Variation in Local Enforce-
ment, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1126, 1128 (2013) (emphasis added).
19. See John Ryan Syllaios, Note, The Future of Discriminatory Local Ordinances Aimed at
Regulating Illegal Immigration, 16 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 639, 642–51 (2010).
20. See Kevin R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration
Status, Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509, 1531–34 (1995).
21. See Kathleen Kim, Introduction: Perspectives on Immigration Reform, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1323, 1330–31 (2011).
22. See Brian Bennett, U.S. Deported Record Number of Illegal Immigrants, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 6,
2010), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/06/nation/la-na-illegal-immigra-
tion-20101007. Recent years also have seen a number of state and local governments enacting
legislation seeking to facilitate enforcement of the federal immigration laws. See infra Part
I.B.2.
23. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, Ten Guiding Principles for Truly Comprehensive Immigra-
tion Reform: A Blueprint, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1599 (2009) (articulating principles with which to
evaluate possible comprehensive immigration reform proposals); Marı́a Pabón López &
Natasha Ann Lacoste, Immigration Reform in 2013–14: An Essay on the Senate’s Bipartisan Plan,
the House’s Standards for Immigration Reform, Interest Convergence and Political Realities, 17 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 121 (2014) (analyzing possible comprehensive immigration reform
proposals).
24. See id. (citing sources analyzing possible immigration reform proposals and a pro-
posed path to legalization for undocumented immigrants).
25. See generally Jordan Grossman, Note, Hidden in Plain Sight: Examining the Obama Ad-
ministration’s Discreet Implementation of a Scaled-Down Version of Comprehensive Immigration Reform,
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1. Secure Communities
Building on the increasingly tough immigration enforcement
measures passed by Congress, “Secure Communities,”26 the Obama
administration’s signature immigration enforcement program, con-
tributed significantly to the consistently high number of removals
of noncitizens from the United States.27 It required state and local
law enforcement agencies to share information with the federal
government about noncitizens who were arrested. It also required
state and local agencies to detain noncitizens for possible immigra-
tion violations so that U.S. immigration authorities could consider
possible removal. The program proved to be particularly efficient at
boosting removal numbers.28 After considerable—and prolonged—
criticism, President Obama unceremoniously ended Secure Com-
munities in 2014.29
When Secure Communities was in place, officials at the highest
levels of the Obama administration regularly emphasized that the
8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 195 (2014) (examining the Obama administration’s immigration
and border enforcement record).
26. For explanation of the workings of Secure Communities, see Bill Ong Hing, Immigra-
tion Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public Policy, 2
UC IRVINE L. REV. 247, 310–11 (2012); Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L.
REV. 149, 207–08 (2013); Steven Papazian, Note, Secure Communities, Sanctuary Laws, and Local
Enforcement of Immigration Law: The Story of Los Angeles, 21 S. CAL. REV. L. & SOC. JUST. 283,
300–04 (2012).
27. Critical analysis of the impacts of the Secure Communities program can be found in
AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY, SE-
CURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS (2011),
available at www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf; Katarina
Ramos, Criminalizing Race in the Name of Secure Communities, 48 CAL. W. L. REV. 317 (2012);
Rachel R. Ray, Insecure Communities: Examining Local Government Participation in U.S. Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement’s “Secure Communities” Program, 10 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 327,
337–38 (2011). See generally Hiroshi Motomura, The Discretion that Matters: Federal Immigration
Enforcement, State and Local Arrests, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1819 (2011)
(analyzing critically state and local government involvement in federal immigration enforce-
ment). The Obama administration has focused on enforcement throughout President
Obama’s time in office, but it also added a formal deferred action program in 2012 with a
proposed expansion in 2014; those programs promised limited relief from removal for cer-
tain groups of undocumented immigrants. See Nikki Hager, Obama Administration and
Immigration Policy: Immigration Enforcement Record in Recent Years—Analysis, EURASIA REV. (Jan.
31, 2015), available at http://www.eurasiareview.com/31012015-obama-administration-immi-
gration-policy-immigration-enforcement-record-recent-years-analysis/.
28. See infra Part I.A.2.
29. See Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Megan Mack,
Officer Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, & Philip A. McNamara, Assistant Sec’y for
Intergovernmental Affairs (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Johnson Memorandum], available at
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities
.pdf.
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program targeted dangerous criminal noncitizens30—”gang
bangers” is the racially-charged parlance favored by President
Obama.31 Despite that justification, Secure Communities led to the
removal of many noncitizens charged with relatively minor criminal
offenses.32 These noncitizens could not reasonably pose serious
safety risks to the public.
[G]overnment records [as of early 2014] show[ ] that since
President Obama took office, two-thirds of the nearly two mil-
lion deportation cases involve people who had committed
minor infractions, including traffic violations, or had no crimi-
nal record at all. Twenty percent—or about 394,000—of the
cases involved people convicted of serious crimes, including
drug-related offenses . . . .33
One empirical study found that, contrary to the claims of the
Obama administration that Secure Communities was designed to
promote public safety, the program did not focus on high crime
areas but instead targeted communities with disproportionately His-
panic populations.34
Consider one memorable example of an effort by U.S. immigra-
tion authorities to remove a “criminal alien.” In 2012, authorities
threatened to remove an undocumented immigrant following an
30. See Jared I. Albert, Development in the Executive Branch: How Secure is Secure Communi-
ties? The Future of One of ICE’s Most Controversial Programs, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 187, 193 (2011);
Stephanie Kang, Note, A Rose by Any Other Name: The Chilling Effect of ICE’s “Secure” Communities
Program, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 83, 106-08 (2012); Christi Parsons, Obama Calls
Himself the “Champion in Chief” of Immigration Reform, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2014), available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2014/mar/06/news/la-pn-obama-immigration-reform-cham-
pion-20140306.
31. See Ginger Thompson & Sarah Cohen, More Deportations Follow Minor Crime, Data
Shows, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2014, at A1 (“With the Obama administration deporting illegal
immigrants at a record place, the President has said the government is going after ‘criminals, gang
bangers, people who are hurting the community, not after students, not after folks who are here just
because they’re trying to figure out how to feed their families.’ ”) (emphasis added).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 33–36 (citing authorities).
33. Thompson & Cohen, supra  note 31; see Editorial, Immigration Bait and Switch, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A22 (“Immigration and Customs Enforcement records show that a
vast majority, 79 percent, of people deported under Secure Communities had no criminal
records or had been picked up for low-level offenses, like traffic violations and juvenile mischief.”) (em-
phasis added); Kavitha Rajagopalan, Deportation Program Casts Too Wide a Net Secure
Communities is Doing More Than Sending the Worst Immigrants Home, NEWSDAY (New York), June
24, 2011, at A34 (“Secure Communities purports to search for repeat illegal immigrant of-
fenders or those charged with major crimes. In practice, most people deported under the program
have had no criminal record at all and were picked up on minor offenses, like speeding.”) (emphasis
added).
34. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 87, 89–90
(2013).
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arrest for trespassing in Sacramento, California. Police arrested the
immigrant in question while she sold homemade tamales in front
of a Wal-Mart store to support her U.S. citizen children.35 A public
outcry to her threatened removal helped convince the U.S. govern-
ment to not seek deportation of the “tamale lady,” who by all
accounts did not pose a serious threat to public safety and could
not be reasonably characterized as a “gang banger.”36
Cases like this are more common than one might imagine.37 Se-
cure Communities required mandatory reporting of noncitizens
charged with minor crimes such as driving an automobile without a
valid driver’s license (or, in the case of the tamale lady, trespass-
ing), as well as serious criminal offenses.38 If public safety was in fact
the true purpose of the program, its design and operation cast an
overbroad net. Indeed, some state and local governments at-
tempted to protect immigrants from the perceived excesses of
Secure Communities by limiting local police cooperation with U.S.
immigration authorities to reporting and detaining only serious
criminal offenders.39 Stiff state and local resistance to Secure Com-
munities seemingly contributed to the Obama administration’s
decision to end the program.40
Given the prevalence of cases in which relatively minor violations
of the law could result in possible removal,41 the Obama administra-
tion’s immigration enforcement agenda in fact operated to
maximize removal numbers rather than to truly focus on the pro-
tection of the safety of the general public. The administration
publicized consistently high numbers of removals and claimed that
they demonstrated its commitment to immigration enforcement.42
35. See Ruben Navarrette Jr., Don’t Deport the “Tamale Lady,” CNN (Aug. 2, 2012), available
at http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/01/opinion/navarrette-deportation-sacramento.
36. See id.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 30–34.
38. See Amelia Fischer, Secure Communities, Racial Profiling & Suppression Law in Removal
Proceedings, 19 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y 63, 87 (2013); Julia Preston & Robert Gebeloff, Unli-
censed Drivers Who Risk More Than a Fine, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2010, at A1.
39. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 7282 (2015) (California TRUST Act, which limits police
cooperation with the U.S. government with respect to noncitizens arrested for minor
crimes).
40. See supra text accompanying note 39. The announcement of the discontinuation of
Secure Communities noted that an increasing number of state and local law enforcement
agencies had refused to cooperate with federal immigration officials in the operation of the
program. See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 29, at l.
41. See supra text accompanying notes 26–36.
42. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: Is the “New” Birmingham the Same as
the “Old” Birmingham?, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 367, 375–76 (2012); Thompson & Cohen,
supra note 31.
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Pointing to removal rates, the administration regularly has called
on Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform.43
Somewhat surprisingly, the Supreme Court has not always acqui-
esced to the Obama administration’s aggressive immigration
enforcement-oriented efforts to remove “criminal aliens.” In just
the past few years, the Court, led by Chief Justice John Roberts,
twice rejected attempts to remove long-term lawful permanent re-
sidents with deep ties to the community for what can only be
reasonably characterized as minor drug convictions.44
Although the Obama administration in 2014 abolished Secure
Communities,45 it continues to make it a priority to remove  nonci-
tizens with certain types of criminal convictions.46
2. Racially Disparate Removals
The Obama administration’s commitment to immigration en-
forcement contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of
noncitizens removed from the United States. Today, the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security regularly deports approximately
400,000 persons a year.47 In fiscal year 2013, for example, the De-
partment of Homeland Security removed approximately 438,000
noncitizens from the United States.48 By way of comparison, remov-
als in 1990 totaled a little over 30,000 a year.49 Thus, removals
43. See Mark Landler, President Urges Speed on Immigration Plan, But Exposes Conflicts, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 30, 2013, at A1.
44. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (rejecting removal order based on
the possession of a small amount of marijuana); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563
(2010) (refusing to affirm removal order based on a criminal conviction for possession of
one tablet of a prescription drug). For analysis of the Supreme Court’s immigration decisions
during the first five years of the Obama presidency, see Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the
Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 66 OKLA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=24805
70.
45. See supra text accompanying note 29.
46. See Johnson Memorandum, supra note 29, at 2–3 (noting that, although Secure
Communities has been discontinued, other programs would be directed at noncitizens con-
victed of criminal offenses that are a high priority for removal).
47. See infra text accompanying notes 48–53.
48. JOHN. F. SIMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS,
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2013 1 (2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/ois_enforcement_ar_2013.pdf. The Obama administration also
has detained about 400,000 noncitizens a year as part of its immigration enforcement efforts.
See César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment, 61 UCLA L.
REV. 1346, 1348, 1401 (2014).
49. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, 2011 YEAR-
BOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 102 (2012), available at https://www.dhs.gov/ sites/default/
files/publications/immigrationstatistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb_2011.pdf.
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increased more than tenfold over the last twenty years, with the
Obama administration reportedly deporting more noncitizens than
any administration in American history.50
The United States removes a disproportionate number of immi-
grants from Mexico and Central America.51 In fiscal year 2013,
citizens of Mexico alone accounted for nearly seventy-two percent
of all removals; deportations of noncitizens from Mexico, Guate-
mala, Honduras, and El Salvador constituted more than ninety-six
percent of all removals.52 By way of comparison, only seventeen per-
cent of the total U.S. population is Hispanic and Mexicans
constitute less than fourteen percent of lawful immigrants and
roughly half of all undocumented immigrants.53 Consequently, as
the nation removes about 400,000 noncitizens (lawful and undocu-
mented immigrants) annually, it deports hundreds of thousands of
citizens from Mexico and Central America each year, with numbers
starkly disproportionate to their representation in the general and
immigrant populations.
In sum, racial minorities, predominantly Latinos, comprise a sig-
nificant number of legal and undocumented immigrants in the
United States. Police enforcement activities frequently target racial
minorities, including Latinos. Under current enforcement priori-
ties, these two factors ensure that Latinos are overwhelmingly
represented in removal proceedings and currently constitute the
vast majority of noncitizens removed from the United States.
50. See Naomi Cobb, Comment, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA): A Non-Legis-
lative Means to an End That Misses the Bull’s Eye, 15 SCHOLAR 651, 664 n.69 (2013); Julia
Preston, Deportations by Courts Drop 47% in 5 Years, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2014, at A12. Statisti-
cal comparisons of the Obama administration’s removal record with those of previous
administrations have been questioned due to changes in the ways that the Executive Branch
counts removals. See Brian Bennett, Figures Skew Number Obama Deports; Immigrants beyond the
Border Area are Less Likely to be Kicked Out Now, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2014, at A1. Any changes in
the tabulation of the administration’s removal numbers, however, cannot change the fact
that the U.S. government under President Obama’s leadership has removed hundreds of
thousands of noncitizens a year from the country.
51. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 49, at 103–04.
52. See SIMANSKI, supra note 48, at 1 (“The leading countries of origin for those removed
from the United States in fiscal year 2013 were Mexico (72 percent), Guatemala (11 per-
cent), Honduras (8.3 percent), and El Salvador (4.8 percent).”).
53. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, USA Quick Facts, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/00000.html (last revised Mar. 31, 2015) (noting that Hispanic or Latino popula-
tion of United States in 2013 was 17.1 percent of total population); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS 2013 4 tbl.3
(2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/ois_lpr_fr_2013.pdf
(compiling data showing that 13.6 percent of lawful permanent residents came from Mex-
ico); PEW RESEARCH CTR., 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S. (Nov. 18, 2014), available
at  http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/11/18/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-
the-u-s/  (stating that citizens of Mexico make up about half of all unauthorized immigrants
in the United States, although their numbers have been declining in recent years).
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B. Racial Profiling in Law Enforcement
Race long has been central to the operation of the U.S. criminal
justice system. From the death penalty54 to disproportionately harsh
prison sentences for crack cocaine use, which is more popular
among African Americans than whites for whom use of powder co-
caine is more prevalent,55 race significantly impacts crime and
punishment in the United States. Critics often accuse local police
departments of profiling African Americans, Latinos, and other ra-
cial minorities in law enforcement activities, including run-of-the-
mill traffic stops.56 Stops for “driving while black” and “driving while
brown” are well-known staples of the nation’s “war on drugs.”57 In
54. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination, Death and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 434 (1995)
(“[A]lthough African-Americans are the victims in half of the murders that occur each year
in the United States, eighty-five percent of the condemned were sentenced to death for
murders of white persons.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminating Discrimination in Administering
the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 519, 522 (1995)
(arguing that race “matters greatly in decisions concerning the death penalty”); Randall L.
Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L.
REV. 1388, 1391 (1988) (asserting that, based on empirical research on race and capital sen-
tencing, states value the lives of whites more highly than those of blacks).
55. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) (holding that African Amer-
ican defendants failed to make the threshold showing necessary to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that similarly situated whites had not
been prosecuted despite the undisputed evidence that all of the cases with crack charges handled by
local federal public defenders that year were brought against black defendants). The Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Armstrong has been roundly criticized. See, e.g., Richard H. McAd-
ams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
605, 606 (1998) (contending that standard established by the Court in Armstrong is nearly
impossible for many defendants with meritorious claims to satisfy).
56. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (detailing the re-emergence of a caste-like system in the
United States with the incarceration of millions of African Americans, who are in effect rele-
gated to a permanent second-class status in U.S. society); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE:
RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE,
CRIME, AND THE LAW (1998); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES,
WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS
(1998). For critical analysis of an extraordinary scandal in which local police focused drug
enforcement efforts in a rural Texas town on African Americans who had been in interracial
relationships, see Kevin R. Johnson, Taking the “Garbage” Out in Tulia, Texas: The Taboo on
Black-White Romance and Racial Profiling in the “War on Drugs,” 2007 WIS. L. REV. 283.
57. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Katherine Barnes, Road Work: Racial Profiling and Drug
Interdiction on the Highway, 101 MICH. L. REV. 651 (2002); David A. Harris, The Stories, the
Statistics, and the Law: Why “Driving While Black” Matters, 84 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265–69 (1999);
Tracey Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 342–54 (1998); Victor C.
Romero, Racial Profiling: “Driving While Mexican” and Affirmative Action, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L.
195 (2000); Floyd Weatherspoon, Ending Racial Profiling of Blacks in the Selective Enforcement of
Laws: In Search of Viable Remedies, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 724–25 (2004). See generally NAACP,
BORN SUSPECT: STOP-AND-FRISK ABUSES & THE CONTINUED FIGHT TO END RACIAL PROFILING IN
AMERICA (2014), available at http://naacp.3cdn.net/f25ade969b0d091f2f_q4m6vwqi6.pdf.
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important respects, blacks and Latinos share common concerns
with race-based policing.58
Because the criminal justice system generates racially disparate
impacts, the Secure Communities program, which focused on
noncitizens caught up in the criminal justice system, also resulted
in racially disparate impacts.59 It should not be surprising that when
the federal removal machinery relies heavily upon state and local
arrests to trigger immigration enforcement action, immigrants of
color—with the largest component of this group being from Mex-
ico and Central America—are disproportionately affected.60
Racially disparate arrest rates significantly contribute to disparate
removals of noncitizens. State and local law enforcement agencies
hand over noncitizens to federal immigration authorities, who then
initiate removal proceedings against them.61 In recent years, this
practice resulted in excess of 300,000 of Latino immigrants being
removed each year from the United States.62 Secure Communities
thus significantly increased the cumulative penalty triggered by the
arrest of noncitizens, with noncitizens of color disparately affected
due to the racially disparate impacts of state and local policing. It is
likely that new federal removal programs that rely on state criminal
convictions will continue to have severe impacts on immigrants of
color.63
Besides the racial impacts created by criminal law enforcement
efforts, the use of race in ordinary immigration enforcement activi-
ties has racially disparate impacts on Latinos as well. Public concern
about the discriminatory enforcement of immigration laws—espe-
cially among Latino U.S. citizens and immigrants—contributes to
the ferocious public debate over immigration, which has become a
pressing civil rights concern to many Americans.64
58. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case for Black and Latina/o Cooperation in Challenging Race
Profiling in Law Enforcement, 55 FLA. L. REV. 341, 357–63 (2003); see, e.g., Chavez v. Illinois
State Police, 251 F.3d 612 (7th Cir. 2001) (addressing claims of racial profiling brought by
African Americans and Hispanics); Giron v. City of Alexander, 693 F. Supp. 2d 904 (E.D. Ark.
2010) (similar claims by Hispanics).
59. See Kang, supra note 30, at 101–02.
60. See supra Part I.A.2.
61. See supra Part I.A.1.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 51–53.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 45–46.
64. See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, Immigration, Civil Rights & the Evolution of the People,
142 DAEDALUS 228 (2013) (exploring immigration as a civil rights issue).
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1. Federal
As the disparate impacts of removals on Latinos suggests, the fed-
eral government is not color-blind in the enforcement of the
immigration laws. Indeed, U.S. immigration enforcement officers
at the ground level have long targeted Latinos for immigration
stops.65 The United States pursues aggressive race-based enforce-
ment of this type throughout the country as well as at the U.S./
Mexico border.66
Immigration enforcement’s fixation on Mexican immigrants in
its border enforcement efforts goes much further than the mere
symbolism of Congress’s continued extension of the fence along
the nation’s southern border.67 Federal immigration enforcement
officers, with the endorsement of the U.S. Supreme Court, rou-
tinely rely on “Mexican” or “Hispanic appearance,” as factors when
deciding to pursue ordinary enforcement actions.68 This practice
remains prevalent despite the vagueness of the terms “Mexican”
and “Hispanic appearance” and despite the fact that many people
who fall in this broad category are lawfully present in the United
States (i.e., they are U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents).69
65. See infra text accompanying notes 67–70.
66. See id.
67. See Secure Fence Act, Pub L. No. 109-367, 120 Stat. 2638 (2006). See generally
Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Why a Wall?, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 147 (2012) (analyzing the politi-
cal and symbolic significance of the “border wall” between the United States and Mexico).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 562–63 (1976) (refusing to
find a Fourth Amendment violation based on an immigration officer’s decision to send a
vehicle to secondary inspection at an immigration checkpoint miles from the border based
on the apparent Mexican ancestry of the occupants of the vehicle); United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885-86 (1975) (holding that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
“Mexican appearance” could be one factor among many that justifies a Border Patrol stop of
a vehicle in the U.S./Mexico border region). But see United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208
F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (distinguishing Martinez-Fuerte and Brignoni-Ponce
and holding that “Hispanic appearance” could not be a factor in an immigration stop in the
U.S./Mexican border region in large part because large numbers of persons in the general
population of that region, including U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants, fall into that broad
category). See also Christian Briggs, Note, The Reasonableness of a Race-Based Suspicion: The
Fourth Amendment and the Costs and Benefits of Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 88 S.
CAL. L. REV 379 (2015) (evaluating the propriety under the Fourth Amendment of racial
profiling in immigration enforcement). See generally Cheryl I. Harris & Devon W. Carbado,
Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1543 (2011) (analyzing criminal procedure
and immigration caselaw that allows for consideration of race not ordinarily permitted by the
Fourth Amendment); Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebel-
lious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1009–45 (2010) (contending that the Supreme Court in
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce authorized a form of racial profiling in immigration
enforcement).
69. See Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78
WASH. U. L. Q. 675, 707–11 (2000).
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Racial profiling of this variety, which relies on statistical probabili-
ties rather than individualized suspicion, contributes to the
consistently high removal rates of Latino immigrants.70
2. State and Local
Fears of discriminatory immigration enforcement are at their
zenith when state and local law enforcement officers, rather than
federal law enforcement, aggressively seek to enforce U.S. immigra-
tion laws.71 Such efforts, through programs such as Secure
Communities as well as through actions pursuant to state and local
immigration enforcement laws, have increased significantly in re-
cent years.72
Generally speaking, local political pressures are more enforce-
ment-oriented than those existing at the national level,73 and at
times appear to be motivated by racial and anti-immigrant ani-
mus.74 In addition, even with training, state and local law
enforcement officers cannot reasonably be expected to have the
same familiarity with U.S. immigration law that their federal immi-
gration officers have.75 State and local officers’ limited
understanding of immigration law makes fair, effective, and racially-
neutral enforcement difficult. Moreover, state and local police
agencies sometimes pursue their own immigration and law enforce-
ment agendas, which creates distinct racially disparate impacts.76
The Supreme Court repeatedly and unequivocally has empha-
sized that the “ ‘[p]ower to regulate immigration is
70. See infra text accompanying notes 51–53.
71. See supra Part I.A.1; infra text accompanying notes 73–93.
72. See Maureen A. Sweeney, Shadow Immigration Enforcement and its Constitutional Dangers,
104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 227, 229–34 (2014) (analyzing increasingly common phenom-
enon of state and local law enforcement involvement in federal immigration enforcement
and the resulting negative civil rights impacts on minority communities). Programs estab-
lished pursuant to INA § 287(g), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g), which allows for state and local training
and cooperation with the federal government pursuant to agreements in immigration en-
forcement, has been challenged as contributing to racial profiling of Latinos in Georgia,
where Adrian Moncrieffe was arrested. See ACLU OF GEORGIA, THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL
PROFILING IN GWINNETT: TIME FOR ACCOUNTABILITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND AN END TO 287(G)
(2010), available at http://www.acluga.org/download_file/view_inline/1504/260.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 81–87 (citing authorities).
74. See id.
75. See, e.g., Castro-O’Ryan v. INS, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th Cir. 1988) (“With only a
small degree of hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed ‘second only to the Inter-
nal Revenue Code in complexity.’ ”) (citation omitted).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 91–93 (discussing judicial finding of unconstitu-
tional law enforcement activities directed at Latinos by a local law enforcement agency).
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unquestionably . . . a federal power.’ ”77 Despite the Court’s emphatic
endorsement of federal primacy over immigration, state and local
governments enthusiastically pushed the envelope of immigration
enforcement during the early years of this century.78 As the Secure
Communities program demonstrates,79 involvement of state and lo-
cal governments in immigration enforcement increased
dramatically nationwide.80 In addition to increased cooperation
with federal immigration authorities, many states—including Ala-
bama, Arizona, Georgia, and South Carolina—and localities—such
as Farmer’s Branch, Texas, Fremont, Nebraska, and Hazleton,
Pennsylvania—enacted laws ostensibly designed to facilitate immi-
gration enforcement.81
Concerns with the demographic changes in certain parts of the
United States, especially in the South and Midwest, fueled tumultu-
ous political movements culminating in the passage of a plethora of
state and local immigration enforcement laws.82 In turn, such laws
struck fear in the hearts of immigrants and Latinos.83 Because of
the Supreme Court’s unequivocal statements about the primacy of
77. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1974 (2011) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added); see Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2498–99 (2012). For analysis
of recent developments in federal preemption of state and local immigration enforcement
laws, see Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601 (2013); Stella Burch Elias,
The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 703 (2013); Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S.
Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: A Reappraisal, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2074 (2013);
Lucas Guttentag, The Forgotten Equality Norm in Immigration Preemption: Discrimination, Harass-
ment, and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, 8 DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013); Kit Johnson
& Peter J. Spiro, Debates, Immigration Preemption after United States v. Arizona, 161 U. PA. L.
REV. ONLINE (2012), available at http://www.pennlawreview.com/debates/index.php?id=47;
Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y
333 (2013).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 79-81 (citing authorities).
79. See supra Part I.A.1.
80. For a collection of essays analyzing the impacts of the proliferation of state and local
immigration enforcement laws, see STRANGE NEIGHBORS: THE ROLE OF STATES IN IMMIGRATION
POLICY (Carissa Byrne Hessick & Gabriel J. Chin eds., 2014).
81. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); City of Hazleton v. Lozano,
724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014); Villas at Parkside Partners v.
Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013) (en banc), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1491 (2014);
United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 531 (4th Cir. 2013); Keller v. City of Fremont, 719
F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2140 (2014); United States v. Alabama, 691
F.3d 1269 (11th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2022 (2013); Georgia Latino Alliance for
Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Georgia, 691 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2012).
82. See Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights: State and Local Efforts to Regulate
Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 634–37 (2012).
83. See id. Hate crimes directed at Latinos also have occurred in some communities
where anti-immigrant tensions have emerged. See generally Kevin R. Johnson & Joanna Cuevas
Ingram, Anatomy of a Modern Day Lynching: The Relationship Between Hate Crimes Against Latina/
os and the Debate Over Immigration Reform, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1613 (2013) (analyzing the relation-
ship between hate crimes and the divisive debate over immigration reform); Maria Pabón
López, An Essay Examining the Murder of Luis Ramirez and the Emergence of Hate Crimes Against
SUMMER 2015] Racial Profiling in the War on Drugs 983
federal authority over immigration, courts frequently ruled that
state and local immigration enforcement measures, in whole or in
part, impermissibly intruded on the federal power to regulate
immigration.84
In order to enhance immigration enforcement, some state laws
require that state and local police officers directly assist the federal
government in its immigration enforcement efforts. Section 2(B) of
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, popularly known as the “show your papers” law,
is the most well-known example of this type of law.85 It requires state
and local law enforcement officers to verify the immigration status
of persons whom they reasonably suspect are in the United States in
violation of the federal immigration laws.86 Officers necessarily ex-
ercise considerable discretion in making that all-important
assessment—with few meaningful objective standards restricting
what can be considered in making that determination.87
Although the Supreme Court invalidated central provisions of
S.B. 1070 as conflicting with the federal power to regulate immigra-
tion, it declined to strike down section 2(B).88 However, the Court
left the door open to future challenges of the section as applied in
individual cases by state and local law enforcement officers.89 Com-
mentators understandably expressed concern that the
implementation of section 2(B) would increase the incidence of ra-
cial profiling of Latinos by local law enforcement agencies.90
Latino Immigrants in the United States, 44 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 155 (2012) (analyzing spate of hate
crimes directed at Latino immigrants).
84. See supra note 81 (citing cases that, with one exception, invalidated core provisions
of the laws).
85. See S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. § 2(B) (Ariz. 2010).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2507–10 (2012).
89. See id.
90. See, e.g., Kristina M. Campbell, (Un)Reasonable Suspicion: Racial Profiling in Immigration
Enforcement After Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 367, 388–94 (2013);
Marjorie Cohn, Racial Profiling Legalized in Arizona, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 168, 170 (2012);
Andrea Christina Nill, Latinos and S.B. 1070: Demonization, Dehumanization, and Disenfranchise-
ment, 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 35, 49–52 (2011); David A. Selden et al., Placing S.B. 1070 and
Racial Profiling into Context, and What S.B. 1070 Reveals About the Legislative Process in Arizona, 43
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 523, 525–43 (2011); see also Barbara Armacost, Immigration Policing: Federalizing
the Local (Sept. 1, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=25
04042 (contending that increased role of state and local law enforcement in immigration
enforcement results in increased racial profiling); McKanders, supra note 77, at 334 (noting
the ongoing debate about whether Arizona v. United States will result in greater racial profiling
in violation of Constitution). Georgia had a provision similar to section 2(B) of Arizona’s SB
1070 in its state immigration enforcement law, which was upheld by the courts despite con-
cerns that it would result in increased racial profiling of Latinos. See Georgia Latino Alliance
for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Arizona, 691 F.3d 1250, 1267–68 & n.12 (11th Cir. 2012).
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Critics who fear that state and local immigration enforcement re-
sults in increased racial profiling appreciate that Latinos, many of
whom are U.S. citizens and lawful immigrants, are frequently stere-
otyped as “foreigners,” subject to possible removal from the
country.91 Melendres v. Arpaio,92 a high-profile piece of civil rights
litigation, illustrates concerns that state and local law police efforts
to facilitate enforcement of the federal immigration laws will result
in increased racial discrimination. In 2013, a district court ruled in
that case that the Maricopa County (Arizona) Sheriff’s Office,
headed by controversial Sheriff Joe Arpaio, engaged in a pattern
and practice of unconstitutionally targeting Latinos, including U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents, in its law enforcement ef-
forts.93 The record of Sheriff Arpaio and cases like Melendres v.
Arpaio demonstrate that the fears of racial discrimination in local
immigration enforcement have a basis in fact.
II. “MONITORING TRAFFIC” ON THE INTERSTATE: THE RACIALLY
SUSPECT TRAFFIC STOP, ARREST, AND CRIMINAL
CONVICTION OF ADRIAN MONCRIEFFE
In Moncrieffe v. Holder, the Supreme Court did not examine the
lawfulness of the stop, search, arrest, and conviction of Adrian Mon-
crieffe, a black immigrant from Jamaica.94 Instead, the Court
focused on the immigration consequences of the criminal convic-
tion.95 Nonetheless, Moncrieffe’s state criminal conviction, which
appears to have influenced by his race, triggered subsequent immi-
gration removal proceedings.96
Part II examines the police report that documents Moncrieffe’s
arrest. The report itself includes a picture of Moncrieffe, which
91. See Kevin R. Johnson “Melting Pot” or “Ring of Fire”?: Assimilation and the Mexican-Ameri-
can Experience, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1259, 1268 (1997).
92. 989 F. Supp. 2d 822 (D. Ariz. 2013), aff’’d in part, vacated and remanded in part, 2015
U.S. App. LEXIS 6110 (9th Cir. Apr. 15, 2015).
93. See id. Sheriff Arpaio and his officers’ reliance on race in law enforcement has been
widely criticized. See, e.g., Mary Romero, Are Your Papers in Order?: Racial Profiling, Vigilantes,
and “America’s Toughest Sheriff,” 14 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 337, 345–52 (2011); see also Johnson,
supra note 82 (analyzing the civil rights impacts on Latinos of increased state and local efforts
to regulate immigration through increased state and local law involvement in enforcement of
the U.S. immigration laws). See generally Kristina M. Campbell, Rising Arizona: The Legacy of the
Jim Crow Southwest on Immigration Law and Policy After 100 Years of Statehood, 24 BERKELEY LA
RAZA L.J. 1 (2014) (summarizing the history of racism in Arizona and its impacts on modern
immigration enforcement).
94. 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013).
95. See infra Part III.
96. See id.
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shows that he is a black man, who at the time of arrest wore his hair
in dreadlocks.97 Overall, the report leaves one with the strong im-
pression that race played an important role in Moncrieffe’s
interactions with the police and thus in his criminal conviction.
A. The Traffic Stop of “Two B/M’s” (Black Males)
On the night of June 13, 2006, in the City of Perry, Georgia, Po-
lice Officer Ron Brainard98 was “monitoring traffic” on Interstate
75, an artery along the Eastern seaboard that includes a stretch ex-
tending from Georgia to Florida.99 At approximately 11:15 p.m., the
officer pulled over Adrian Moncrieffe, a resident of Palm Beach,
Florida, as he drove south in a black Chevrolet Tahoe. Officer Brai-
nard noted in the police report that he stopped the Chevrolet
Tahoe because he observed that the dark tinting on the vehicle’s
windows appeared to violate Georgia law.100 He later explained that
he looked for:
[A]ny violation of law that establishes probable cause to make a
traffic stop. . . . [I]n this case, the vehicle passed me with an
obvious tint violation. . . . I particularly like the tint violation as a
reason for stopping folks because it negates the argument that I stopped
a particular sex or race. If you can’t see what’s in the vehicle, they
97. See Perry (Georgia) Police Department Supplemental Narrative (June 14, 2006), on
file with author [hereinafter Police Report]. The Police Report was provided in response to a
public information request pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. §§ 50-18-70–50-18-77. For critical
analysis on the use of police reports in immigration court proceedings, see Mary Holper,
Confronting Copis in Immigration Court, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 675 (2015).
98. In October 2014, Officer Brainard described himself as having thirty-four years of
experience in law enforcement, including working from 2000–08 with the Perry Police De-
partment before moving to the Houston County Sherriff’s Office. Memorandum from
Ronald. R. Brainard to Laraya M. Parnell, at 1 (Oct. 14, 2014) (on file with author) [hereinaf-
ter Brainard Memo]. One of Brainard’s positions at the Perry Police Department was as a “K9
Officer” member of the Proactive Criminal Enforcement Team. See id.
99. See Police Report, supra note 97, at 2. Racial profiling by law enforcement officers
has been reported on Interstate 75. See Gene Callaham & William Anderson, The Roots of
Racial Profiling, REASON.COM (Aug. 1, 2001), available at http://reason.com/archives/2001/
08/01/the-roots-of-racial-profiling. I-75 has been characterized by officers as a drug corridor.
See Jacqueline Ingles, Narcotics Investigators: I-75 is A “Cocaine Corridor,” WCTV (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://www.wctv.tv/home/headlines/42152567.html. Several years after the Moncrieffe ar-
rest, Officer Brainard wrote that “I75 is a corridor for criminal activity. . . . Narcotics are
brought up from the west now . . . into Atlanta. We then see the mid-level shipments coming
out of Atlanta going to cities throughout southern Georgia and Florida. The largest amount
of money I have stopped was $200 grand. The largest drug seizure I had was 15 kilograms of
cocaine.”  Brainard Memo, supra note 98, at 2.
100. See Police Report, supra note 97, at 3.
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certainly can’t say you stopped them because they were a par-
ticular sex or race. In today’s world, it seems to be the number
one argument presented as a defense.101
Because Officer Brainard observed Moncrieffe’s sport utility vehicle
at night, it is uncertain what he could see physically that would lead
him to believe that the tint on the Chevrolet Tahoe’s windows was
too dark.
After the traffic stop, Officer Brainard approached the vehicle
and “saw the window roll down and made contact with two B/M’s
[black males]102 inside the vehicle. The driver was later identified as
Adrian Moncrieffe, 12-19-1980 and the passenger as Keyaonta
Robinson, 7-28-1987.”103 Brainard later “checked the tint with [his]
meter and found it to be 3%, well below the legal limit.”104
B. The Factors Leading to the Suspicion of Criminal Activity
After stopping the vehicle, Officer Brainard initially talked with
Adrian Moncrieffe.105 A number of statements by Moncrieffe in re-
sponse to questioning, combined with the officer’s observations
and experience, contributed to the officer’s suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot.106 It cannot be said for certain what role, if any,
the fact that Moncrieffe and the passenger were black played in
Officer Brainard’s questioning and suspicions.
1. Air Fresheners
In the initial contact with the “two B/M’s,” Officer Brainard
smelled “a strong odor of an air freshener like it was just sprayed in
101. Brainard Memo, supra note 98, at 1–2 (emphasis added). Police officers in Georgia
routinely rely on window tint violations as a basis for traffic stops. See, e.g., Ciak v. State, 597
S.E.2d 392, 395 (Ga. 2004); Beville v. State, 745 S.E.2d 858, 862 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013); Montero
v. State, 537 S.E.2d 429, 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
102. See Police Report, supra note 97, at 1. Brainard later confirmed that the reference to
“B/M’s” in the police report was to “black males.” Brainard Memo, supra note 97, at 2.
103. See Police Report, supra note 97, at 3. Georgia, like other states, has seen allegations
of racial profiling by police, including in the well-known case of black filmmaker Tyler Perry.
See, e.g., Atlanta Police Clear White Officers of Profiling in Tyler Perry Case, CNN (Sept. 12, 2012),
available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/11/showbiz/tyler-perry-profiling-case; McRae v.
Hogan, 732 S.E. 2d 853 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (remanding case for further consideration of
claims of racial profiling of blacks by police).
104. See Police Report, supra note 97, at 3.
105. See id.
106. See id. at 3–5.
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the vehicle.”107 He observed an air freshener hanging on the
rearview mirror of the Chevrolet Tahoe.108 Another freshener hung
on the clothes hook in the rear passenger seat, which the police
report described as “a strange location for a hanging air
freshener.”109
2. The Age of Moncrieffe’s “Friend”
Officer Brainard stated in the police report that he was suspi-
cious of Moncrieffe’s claim that he was friends with the passenger,
Keyaonta Robinson.110 The stated reason for the suspicion was that
Moncrieffe was “several years older”—in actuality about six-and-a-
half years older—than Robinson.111 The report did not offer any
further explanation about why the officer questioned the friend-
ship or why it might lead to the conclusion that criminal activity was
afoot.
3. Ownership of the Chevrolet Tahoe
The police report states that Officer Brainard doubted Mon-
crieffe’s statement that the Chevrolet Tahoe belonged to his
father.112 For reasons not fully explained in the police report,113 Of-
ficer Brainard based his doubt on the speaker and stereo system in
the vehicle.114 The report states that the system led the officer to
believe that Moncrieffe operated the vehicle more than his father
did.115 It was uncertain why this speculation, even if true, was sali-
ent, especially in light of the fact that the vehicle registration listed
Moncrieffe’s father as the legal owner of the Chevrolet Tahoe.
4. Excessive Luggage
Moncrieffe told Officer Brainard that he had driven from Palm
Beach to visit his daughter for three days in Atlanta. According to
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the police report, Moncrieffe “claimed to [make this trip] once a
month,”116 thus insinuating that this was a travel pattern indicative
of drug trafficking. The travel might also suggest that Moncrieffe is
a dutiful parent. Officer Brainard later elaborated that he was suspi-
cious that the luggage and stereo speakers were in the back seat,
leaving room in the trunk for drugs. No contraband, however, was
found in the subsequent search of the trunk.117
Officer Brainard commented in the report that Moncrieffe had
“more luggage than would be necessary for a three day trip.”118
5. Bringing a Friend to Visit His Daughter
Officer Brainard wrote in the police report that he thought it out
of the ordinary that Moncrieffe “was taking a friend to hang with
him while allegedly visiting his daughter in Atlanta.”119 A desire to
have company on a long drive, however, would seem to be an inno-
cent, and entirely plausible, explanation for Moncrieffe having
Robinson accompany him on the road trip.
* * * *
Although the report claimed that Moncrieffe’s statements and
Officer Brainard’s observations raised suspicion, all these state-
ments, as well as what the officer observed, could have innocent
explanations. For example, how often has a person packed what
others characterize as excessive luggage for a trip? Is an abundance
of air freshener in a vehicle on a warm Georgia summer night espe-
cially odd? Why is it suspicious to bring a friend or acquaintance on
a long drive?
The fact that Officer Brainard recited a series of innocent factors
in the police report as raising suspicions of unlawful activity sug-
gests that he hoped to conjure up a basis to justify a search of the
sport utility vehicle. The totality of the circumstances outlined in
the police report to this point would not seem to provide the proba-
ble cause necessary for a search.120
116. Id.
117. See id. at 3–5.
118. Id at 3.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 3–5.
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C. The Interview of the Passenger, the Subsequent Search,
and Moncrieffe’s Arrest
Officer Brainard initially talked with Moncrieffe outside the vehi-
cle. The officer later explained that he followed this practice so that
the driver’s story could be secured and compared to the passen-
ger’s statements.121 The practice also allowed any masking odor to
dissipate; “in this case, after a few minutes, the cologne was gone
and the marijuana could be plainly smelled.”122
Officer Brainard next returned to the Chevrolet Tahoe to ques-
tion the passenger, Keyaonta Robinson.123 According to the police
report, the officer “detected the odor of marijuana inside the vehi-
cle.”124 The smell of marijuana led to further questioning of
Robinson and Moncrieffe and ultimately culminated in a search of
the Chevrolet Tahoe.
Officer Brainard “asked Robinson about the trip and his answers
mostly mirrored Moncrieffe [sic].”125 The consistency of the state-
ments of the two men might well indicate that both had told the
officer the truth.
When the officer asked Robinson if he and Moncrieffe had
“smoked marijuana in the vehicle . . . . [Robinson’s] eyes opened
wide in surprise and answered no.”126 Officer Brainard wrote in the
report that he observed signs of an “adrenaline dump in that
[Robinson’s] breathing became quick and shallow and you could
see him visibly shaking.”127 Such a reaction, however, would be un-
derstandable even if Robinson had not smoked marijuana and was
completely innocent of wrongdoing. At this point, Officer Brainard
“asked [Robinson] to step out of the vehicle.”128 He searched
Robinson but did not uncover any contraband or drug
paraphernalia.129
Officer Brainard further questioned Moncrieffe, who was stand-
ing with another officer, “FTO Kessler,” who had arrived on the
scene in a separate patrol car.130 Officer Brainard asked Moncrieffe
121. See Brainard Memo, supra note 98, at 3.
122. See id.






129. See id. at 4.
130. See id. Kessler and Brainard constituted the Police Department’s Proactive Criminal
Enforcement Team; according to Officer Brainard, Kessler would come to assist when Officer
Brainard made a traffic stop, and vice versa. Brainard Memo, supra note 98, at 2.
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if he and Robinson had smoked marijuana. Moncrieffe admitted to
having smoked a “blunt”—a marijuana cigarette—earlier in the
day.131
Officer Brainard next searched Moncrieffe. He did not find con-
traband or anything suspicious.132 “Both [Moncrieffe and
Robinson] were handcuffed at that point for [the officers’] safety.
They were told they were in investigative custody pending the final
investigation. Moncrieffe admitted that there was more marijuana in the
vehicle.”133
Based on the odor of marijuana and Moncrieffe’s statements, Of-
ficer Brainard next had “K9 Rex,” a police dog evidently trained to
search for drugs,134 sniff the exterior of the Chevrolet Tahoe.135 The
fact that a drug sniffing dog accompanied Officer Brainard on the
patrol suggests that drug interdiction was one of the reasons that
the officer spent the evening “monitoring traffic” on the inter-
state.136 The dog “gave a change of behavior on the driver’s door
section, then a final response by sitting on the driver door.”137
Officer Brainard summarized the fruits of the search of the vehi-
cle in the police report as follows:
A plastic bag tied in a knot was found on the passenger floor
board and contained several different items that could be used
as masking odors. At least two large bottles of Super Scented
Fresheners were found throughout the vehicle. I noted tooling
on many screws throughout the vehicle. The driver door had a
plate that allows access to the natural void in the door. I pulled
that plate back and found the void empty, however, a very
strong odor of marijuana could be smelled. I could also smell
131. Police Report, supra note 97, at 4.
132. See id.
133. The police report does not explain why Moncrieffe made this spontaneous incrimi-
nating statement. It could be that he wanted to avoid Officer Brainard being surprised upon
finding a small amount of contraband in the search of the vehicle.
134. For further analysis of the lawfulness of police use of drug sniffing dogs to establish
probable cause, see Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (holding that the use of drug
sniffing dog during a lawful traffic stop for speeding (which led to the discovery of drugs) did
not violate the Fourth Amendment); Irus Braverman, Passing the Sniff Test: Police Dogs as Sur-
veillance Technology, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 81 (2013); see also Rodriguez v. United States, 2015 U.S.
LEXIS 2807 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Apr. 21, 2015) (holding that a dog sniff after completion of a
traffic stop violates the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (revers-
ing unanimously a Florida Supreme Court ruling that required a log of a drug sniffing dog’s
performance before finding probable cause to search a vehicle after the dog alerted to the
vehicle). During Officer Perry’s stint with the Perry Police Department, a drug sniffing ca-
nine regularly accompanied him on patrol. See Brainard Memo, supra note 98, at 1–2.
135. See Police Report, supra note 97, at 4.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 98–99.
137. Id.
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a strong odor of marijuana in the rear cargo area of the vehi-
cle; however, nothing was located in that area. In the center
console, I removed the interior liner of the storage area and
found a plastic bag of green leafy material suspected to be ma-
rijuana. Inside that bag, I saw a smaller dime bag with
marijuana, and a second sandwich size bag with marijuana. It
was my opinion these bags were packaged for sale. Between
the passenger seat and center console, I located a brown wal-
let. Inside the wallet were three separate bundles of US currency. I have
seen money separated out like this in the past when making narcotics
arrest. [sic] The money is bundled this way specifically so the carrier
can remember what he has and where specific bundles go to or come
from. I counted out the money and found it to be $1050. When
asked, Moncrieffe believed he had approximately $1500. The
marijuana and money was seized based on the three separate
packs of marijuana and other indicators observed.138
According to the police report, FTO Kessler ran a criminal back-
ground check on the two occupants of the Chevrolet Tahoe.139 That
check revealed that “Moncrieffe had a history that included narcot-
ics sales. Robinson only had a history of narcotics use.”140 Officer
Brainard later acknowledged that the criminal records database
that the Perry Police Department utilized showed arrests as well as
criminal convictions.141
The officer concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to
charge Robinson with a crime; he later was released.142 Moncrieffe
was not so lucky. The “Application for Warrant” for his arrest stated
the following:
Narrative:
Said accused did possess Marijuana, a Controlled Substance, in
an amount or packaged indicative of distribution, in violation
of the Georgia Controlled Substances Act.
138. Id. (emphasis added). Although there does not appear to be any forfeiture of assets
in Moncrieffe’s case, commentators have observed that the war on drugs has been fueled in
no small part by asset forfeitures in connection with drug arrests. See Eric Blumenson & Eva
Nilsen, Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 35, 50–56
(1998). See also Drug Forfeiture Laws Work for You!, THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF HOUSTON
COUNTY, http://www.houstonda.org/houston-county-law-school/drug-forfeiture-laws-work-
for-you.html (last visited May 28, 2015).
139. See Police Report, supra note 97, at 4.
140. Id.
141. See Brainard Memo, supra note 98, at 4.
142. Police Report, supra note 97, at 4–5.
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Probable Cause:
I made traffic stop [sic] for a tint violation on the vehicle
driven by Moncrieffe. The tint was 3%. During the stop, mari-
juana was smelled inside the vehicle. Moncrieffe then
admitted marijuana was in the vehicle. K9 Rex conducted a
free air sniff with a positive alert on the exterior of the vehicle.
During the search, three bags of marijuana packaged for sale
was [sic] located under the center console in a hidden com-
partment. In addition, $1050 cash was located in Moncrieffe’s
wallet in three separated bundles.143
D. The Conviction
The Supreme Court briefly summarized Adrian Moncrieffe’s
criminal proceedings in the Georgia state court system subsequent
to the arrest as follows:
During a 2007 traffic stop, police found 1.3 grams of mari-
juana in his car. This is the equivalent of about two or three
marijuana cigarettes. Moncrieffe pleaded guilty to possession
of marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of Ga. Code
Ann. § 16-13-30(j)(1) (2007). Under a Georgia statute provid-
ing more lenient treatment to first-time offenders, §42-8-60(a)
(1997), the trial court withheld entering a judgment of convic-
tion or imposing any term of imprisonment, and instead
required that Moncrieffe complete five years of probation, af-
ter which his charge will be expunged altogether . . . .144
Moncrieffe later stated that his attorney did not advise him that
the plea agreement and conviction could result in his removal from
the United States.145 That failure runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Padilla v. Kentucky.146
143. Id. at 6.
144. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013). One of the conditions of Mon-
crieffe’s probation was “banishment from Houston County except to drive thru on I-75.”
Brief for the Petitioner, Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 app. at 14 (capitals in original
deleted), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/sup
reme_court_preview/briefs/11-702_petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf.
145. See Nina Totenberg, Justices Say U.S. Improperly Deported Man Over Marijuana, NPR,
(Apr. 23, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/04/23/178651009/justices-say-u-s-im-
properly-deported-man-over-marijuana.
146. 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (holding that failure to advise a noncitizen of the possible re-
moval resulting from a plea agreement and conviction violates the right to effective assistance
of counsel under the Sixth Amendment). In Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1106–13
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The facts leading to Adrian Moncrieffe’s criminal conviction sug-
gest that race played a subtle, yet salient, role in the interactions
between the police officer and Moncrieffe. The next section consid-
ers the facts suggesting that race influenced the police interactions.
E. The Suggestion of Racial Profiling in the Traffic Stop and Search
Race permeates the series of interactions between the officer and
the occupants of the vehicle and subsequent search of Adrian Mon-
crieffe’s Chevrolet Tahoe. The police report initially specified that
Moncrieffe and his passenger were “two B/M’s.”147 It cannot be said
with certainty how, if at all, the race of the driver and passenger
influenced Officer Brainard’s decision to stop the vehicle, his inter-
actions with, and questioning of, Adrian Moncrieffe and Keyaonta
Robinson, and his suspicion of unlawful activity. However, at a mini-
mum, the officer found the race of the two men worth mentioning
at the outset of the police report.
The alleged window tint violation, a preferred reason of Officer
Brainard for a traffic stop, seems dubious given that the stop was at
night.148 Moreover, it bore little relevance to the subsequent ques-
tioning, search, arrest, and ultimate drug conviction of
Moncrieffe.149
A series of innocent factors, including the finding of air
fresheners in the vehicle and a variety of other factually-based spec-
ulations, raised the officer’s initial suspicions.150 Only after he
stopped and questioned Moncrieffe did Officer Brainard smell the
odor of marijuana in the vehicle.151 He then obtained admissions
from Moncrieffe that he had smoked marijuana earlier in the day
and that there was marijuana in the vehicle.152 A drug-sniffing dog
happened to be accompanying Officer Brainard, indicating that
drug interdiction was one reason he was monitoring traffic on the
interstate.153
There are hints that Officer Brainard relied on race in the stop,
interviews of the two men, and search of the vehicle. Moncrieffe’s
initial encounter with police was the result of a traffic stop wholly
(2013), the Supreme Court held that the holding in Padilla did not apply retroactively to plea
agreements, such as Moncrieffe’s, entered before the decision.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 102–103.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 100–101.
149. See supra Part II.A.–D.
150. See supra Part II.B.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 123–124.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 131.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 98–99.
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unrelated to the drug offense for which he was eventually ar-
rested.154 Given Officer Brainard’s statement that he looked for
“any violation of law,”155 it seems that the window tint violation
might have been a pretext to justify a traffic stop based on a
hunch—especially because such a violation was admittedly his pre-
ferred basis for a stop.156 The police report does not suggest that
Moncrieffe was driving in excess of the speed limit or otherwise vio-
lating the traffic laws.
Reliance on a possible window tint violation for the traffic stop
probably did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment.157 This is
true even if the officer’s reliance on that suspected violation served
as a pretext for the stop.158 The Supreme Court has held that,
under the Fourth Amendment, police may stop a vehicle if a
“totality of the circumstances” supports a “reasonable suspicion”
that the law has been violated.159 In reviewing the circumstances
offered by police to justify a stop, even if based on some inno-
cent facts, the Court ordinarily finds that the judgment of
the police officer is entitled to deference.160 In United States v.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 98–104.
155. See supra text accompanying note 101.
156. See id.
157. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 817–19 (1996) (holding that, consistent
with the Fourth Amendment, police officer may rely on a traffic violation, even if pretextual,
for a stop based on race, to make a traffic stop). A claim under the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment may prevail if it is established that a police officer intentionally
discriminated on the basis of race in making the stop. See id. at 813. Such a discriminatory
intent is difficult to prove. See generally Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (criticizing require-
ment of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) that a discriminatory intent must be
established to prove an Equal Protection violation). For analysis of the racial dimensions of
the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see generally Devon W. Carbado,
[E]Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002).
158. See id.
159. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment is satisfied if a law enforcement officer’s action is supported by reasonable suspi-
cion that criminal activity “may be afoot”) (citation omitted).
160. See, e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (“A trial judge views the
facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community;
likewise, a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and exper-
tise. The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield
inferences that deserve deference.”) (emphasis added); United State v. Dopolito, 713 F.3d 141,
150–53 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1133–34 (10th Cir. 2005); see
also Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014) (stating that the reasonable suspi-
cion “standard takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture’ ”)
(quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266, 273 (2002) (“When discussing how reviewing courts should make reasonable-suspicion
determinations, we have said repeatedly that they must look at the ‘totality of the circum-
stances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective
basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.”) (citation omitted). Criticism of the discretion given
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Arvizu,161 for example, the Supreme Court held that the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit erred in finding that “innocent”
factors in a Border Patrol officer’s overall set of factors for a traffic
stop could not be weighed in evaluating whether the totality of the
circumstances justified the stop under the Fourth Amendment.
While searching the vehicle, Officer Brainard found a small
amount of marijuana, specifically the equivalent of a few marijuana
cigarettes, and a little more than $1,000 in cash.162 Based on those
facts, along with the other factors previously discussed and his expe-
rience in previous narcotics arrests, the officer speculated that
Moncrieffe sold marijuana.163 It is unclear whether the fact that
Moncrieffe was black contributed to the speculation.164 Officer Brai-
nard considered the amount of cash and its bundling to justify his
suspicions.165
All said, the stop, arrest, and conviction of Adrian Moncrieffe
may well have been consistent with current Fourth Amendment
doctrine. The suspected window tint violation arguably satisfied the
Constitution’s reasonable suspicion requirement for a traffic stop
even if a pretext for the officer’s decision to stop the vehicle.166 The
alleged smell of marijuana in all likelihood provided the probable
cause necessary to justify the search of the vehicle. The contraband
found by police, even though only a small amount, was sufficient
evidence to lead to Moncrieffe’s arrest and criminal conviction.167
by the Supreme Court to police officers and trial courts in the reasonable suspicion determi-
nation can be found in Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth Amendment: A Cultural
Study of the Drug War: Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. REV. 851, 889–93 (2002) and
Tracey Maclin, Terry v. Ohio’s Fourth Amendment Legacy: Black Men and Police Discretion, 72 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 1271, 1306–20 (1998). Further analysis of the evidence of racial profiling can
be found in Lewis R. Katz, “Lonesome Road”: Driving Without the Fourth Amendment, 36 SEATTLE
U.L. REV. 1413 (2013); Sean Childers, Note, Discrimination During Traffic Stops: How an Eco-
nomic Account Justifying Racial Profiling Falls Short, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1025, 1032–33 (2012);
Melissa Whitney, Note, The Statistical Evidence of Racial Profiling in Traffic Stops and Searches:
Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatory Intent, 49 B.C. L. REV. 263 (2008).
161. 534 U.S. 266, 274–78 (2002); see Erik Luna, Hydraulic Pressures and Slight Deviations,
2008-2009 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 133, 156 (2009) (“Reasonable suspicion can even be provided
by a series of innocuous facts, collectively amounting to lawful activity subject to innocent
explanation, so long as law enforcement could infer criminal activity was afoot. It can be
suspicious, for example, when a driver does not look over at a patrol car, based on that
officer’s ‘experience’ that ‘most persons look over’ and give him a ‘friendly wave.’ ”) (inter-
nal citation omitted).
162. See supra text accompanying note 138.
163. See id.
164. However, having money on hand no doubt proved helpful when Moncrieffe had to
bail himself out of jail on a controlled substances charge while away from his home state.
165. See supra text accompanying notes 138.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 157–161.
167. See id.
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Still, race appeared to play a role in Moncrieffe’s interactions
with the police. At a minimum, the specifics of the interactions with
Officer Brainard and the two “B/Ms” warrant concern.
III. THE REMOVAL CASE IN THE SUPREME COURT
A traffic stop on an interstate highway initiated a series of events
that took Adrian Moncrieffe through the Georgia criminal justice
system before his case percolated through the U.S. immigration re-
moval system all the way to the Supreme Court. The Court in turn
reviewed his case as a straightforward immigration removal case, ig-
noring the racial overtones to Moncrieffe’s stop, arrest, and
criminal conviction.168 Indeed, from reading the Court’s opinion,
one could not say for certain that Moncrieffe was black, even
though that fact may well have triggered the initial traffic stop and
shaped the subsequent interactions with the police that culminated
in the criminal conviction.169
The Supreme Court matter-of-factly described the removal pro-
ceedings as follows:
Petitioner Adrian Moncrieffe is a Jamaican citizen who came
to the United States legally in 1984, when he was three . . .
alleging that this Georgia conviction constituted an aggravated
felony, the Federal Government sought to deport Mon-
crieffe. . . . An Immigration Judge agreed and ordered
Moncrieffe removed. . . . The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) affirmed that conclusion on appeal . . . .170
168. See supra Part II.
169. In this respect, the Court’s decision is reminiscent of its decision rejecting a claim
that racial profiling violated the Fourth Amendment. See Johnson, supra note 69, at 1060
(stating that the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996)
that “the problem of pretextual stops based on the race of the occupants of an automobile
came up in the briefs and oral argument. Nevertheless, in restating the facts of the case the
Court failed to mention that Whren and Brown were African-American, one of the central
facts of the entire case and its briefing. The Court instead delayed mentioning this most
salient fact until later in the opinion in introducing the legal analysis of the Fourth Amend-
ment claim: ‘Petitioners [Whren and Brown], who are both black, . . . contend that police
officers might decide which motorists to stop based on decidedly impermissible factors, such
as the race of the car’s occupants.’ ”) (footnotes omitted).
170. Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678, 1683 (2013) (citations omitted). Possession of
such a small amount of marijuana for personal use would not violate current law in several
states. See Brandy Zadrozny, From Dry to High: Your Guide to State Pot Laws, DAILY BEAST (Jan.
29, 2014), http:/www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/01/29/from-dry-to-high-your-guide-
to-state-pot-laws.html (reporting that by that time, sixteen states had decriminalized the pos-
session of small amounts of marijuana).
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In an opinion by well-known conservative jurist Edith Jones, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied Moncrieffe’s peti-
tion for review of the removal order.171
In a 7-2 decision,172 the Supreme Court resolved a split among
the circuits, in an opinion by Justice Sonia Sotomayor.173 The split
centered on whether a conviction under a state statute that simulta-
neously criminalizes conduct classified by both the federal
Controlled Substance Act’s felony and misdemeanor provisions
may constitute a felony, thereby making the crime an “aggravated
felony” under U.S. immigration law.174 Following the so-called cate-
gorical approach to the classification of state criminal offenses as
aggravated felonies,175 the Court held that the misdemeanor convic-
tion under state law criminalizing mere possession of a small
amount of marijuana for personal use, as well as possession for sale,
failed to constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of removal.176
In Moncrieffe v. Holder, a Supreme Court known for its conserva-
tism rejected,177 for the second time in the last five Terms,178 the
U.S. government’s contention that a relatively minor drug offense
constituted an aggravated felony for purposes of the immigration
laws. The Court previously held in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder179 that
a conviction for unlawful possession of one tablet of a prescription
drug by an immigrant from Mexico failed to constitute an aggra-
vated felony under the immigration laws. Those decisions together
171. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 662 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2011). The immigration court pro-
ceedings were held in Oakdale, Louisiana, the location of the immigrant detention facility in
which the U.S. government detained Moncrieffe, which is within the jurisdiction of the Fifth
Circuit.
172. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 1678.
173. See id. at 1684 n.3 (noting circuit conflict).
174. See id. at 1683–85.
175. See, e.g., Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: Resurrecting the
Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669 (2011); Jennifer Lee Koh, The
Whole Better Than the Sum: A Case for the Categorical Approach to Determining the Immigration Conse-
quences of Crime, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257 (2012); Laura Jean Eichten, Comment, A Felony, I
Presume? 21 USC § 841(b)’s Mitigating Provision and the Categorical Approach in Immigration Pro-
ceedings, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1093 (2012). The Court also followed the categorical approach in
an analogous setting the same Term in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013). The
Board of Immigration Appeals subsequently offered guidance on the application of the Su-
preme Court’s categorical approach in Moncrieffe v. Holder in In re Martin Chairez-Castrejon, 26
I. & N. Dec. 349 (B.I.A. 2014).
176. See Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. at 1686–87. Importantly, the Court reserved the
discretionary authority to remove Moncrieffe from the United States based on the minor
drug offense. See Victor C. Romero, A Meditation on Moncrieffe: On Marijuana, Misdemeanants,
and Migrants, 49 GONZ. L. REV. 23, 32–33 (2013/14).
177. See H. Jefferson Powell, About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of Constitu-
tional Law, 86 WASH L REV. 217, 218 (2011).
178. See infra text accompanying note 177 (discussing Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder).
179. 560 S. Ct. 563 (2010).
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demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to subject long-term lawful per-
manent residents of the United States to the equivalent of
mandatory removal based on small time drug convictions. In both
circumstances, the Court rejected the agency’s interpretation of the
immigration laws that would have resulted in removal of a lawful
permanent resident from the United States.180
Moncrieffe v. Holder is an important sign of the modern immigra-
tion times. Although the facts leading to the criminal conviction
were not before the Court, the police report strongly suggests that
race played an important role in the conviction and near removal
of a long-term lawful permanent resident from the United States.181
Adrian Moncrieffe’s story does not appear to be out of the ordi-
nary. Racial profiling in traffic stops at the heart of the war on drugs
disparately affects people of color.182 By relying on local and state
law enforcement to trigger immigration proceedings, the federal
immigration removal machinery frequently amplifies the racially
disparate impacts.183 The separation of these two seemingly race
neutral systems obscures the relationship and magnitude of the ra-
cially disparate impacts they create.184 Nonetheless, these systems
operating together adversely impact communities of color.185
Moncrieffe v. Holder appears to be the tip of the proverbial ice-
berg. Today, immigration removals fall disproportionately on
communities of color.186 By focusing on “criminal aliens” in re-
moval efforts,187 the Executive Branch exacerbates the racially
disparate impacts created by the criminal justice system. When the
U.S. government relies on state and federal criminal convictions in
immigration enforcement and removal proceedings, it multiplies
the racial impact of the criminal justice system.188
180. See supra text accompanying notes 172–176, 179.
181. See supra Part II.
182. See supra Part I.B.
183. See supra Part I.A.
184. See supra Part I. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A Case Study of Color-Blindness: The
Racially Disparate Impacts of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 and the Failure of Comprehensive Immigration Re-
form, 2 UC IRVINE L. REV. 313 (2012) (analyzing how the color blindness of the modern
immigration laws masks racially disparate impacts).
185. See supra Part I.
186. See supra Part I.A.2.
187. See supra Part II.
188. See id.
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CONCLUSION
The travails of Adrian Moncrieffe exemplify how criminal law en-
forcement and immigration enforcement align to the detriment of
minorities, particularly black and Latino immigrants. Immigration
reform, either through legislation or change in Executive Branch
enforcement priorities and practices, is in order. These reforms
should seek to remove the taint of race from the removal process.
At a minimum, attention should be paid to the racially disparate
impacts of the modern immigration removal process, its increasing
reliance on criminal activity to trigger removal proceedings, and
the adverse social consequences of removal of long term residents
from family, friends, and community in the United States.189
189. See supra text accompanying note 4 (citing authorities).

